End Burma’s System of Impunity

By PAULO SERGIO PINHEIRO
Published: May 27, 2009

SAO PAULO, BRAZIL — The Nobel Peace Prize laureate, Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, has spent 13 years under house arrest in Myanmar. This week, the Burmese junta is likely to extend her detention for up to five years under the trumped-up charge of allowing a visitor into her compound.

During eight years as United Nations Special Rapporteur on Myanmar, I repeatedly called on the Burmese junta to release Mrs. Aung San Suu Kyi and Burma’s 2,100 other political prisoners, to no avail. It is imperative that she be released immediately for the country’s process of reconciliation to move forward.

But while Suu Kyi has deservedly received a great deal of international attention over the past two decades, Myanmar’s ethnic minorities — more than one-third of the population — have suffered without international outcry. For Myanmar’s process of national reconciliation to be successful, the plight of the minorities must also be addressed.

Over the past 15 years, the Burmese Army has destroyed over 3,300 villages in a systematic and widespread campaign to subjugate ethnic groups. U.N. reports indicate that Burmese soldiers have frequently recruited child soldiers, used civilians as minesweepers and forced thousands of villagers into slave labor.

An official policy of impunity has empowered soldiers to rape and pillage. According to one account, in December 2008 a Burmese soldier marched into an ethnic Karen village in eastern Myanmar and abducted, raped and killed a 7-year old girl. Authorities refused to arrest the soldier; instead, officers threatened the parents with punishment if they did not accept a cash bribe to keep quiet.

In 2002, I received a report about 625 women who were systematically raped in Myanmar ’s Shan State over a five-year period. There was not a single account of successful prosecution.

I repeatedly documented the military’s many abuses in reports to the U.N. General Assembly and the U.N. Commission on Human Rights. My work is only one example of U.N. efforts in Myanmar — since 1990, U.N. representatives have visited the country 37 times in an attempt to facilitate dialogue and promote human rights.

They have exhausted all domestic and diplomatic remedies without achieving human rights protection and national reconciliation in Myanmar. And while the U.N. General Assembly and the U.N. Human Rights Council have passed over 35 resolutions regarding Myanmar, the U.N. Security Council has yet to pass a single one. The United Nations will not be successful until the Security Council acts to directly address our stagnant efforts.

It is clear that the attacks in Myanmar will continue. It is equally evident that the country’s domestic legal system will not punish those perpetrating crimes against ethnic minorities.

It is time for the United Nations to take the next logical step: The Security Council must establish a commission of inquiry into crimes against humanity and impunity in Myanmar. The Security Council took similar steps with regard to Rwanda, Bosnia and Darfur. The situation in Myanmar is equally as critical.

Creating a commission of inquiry will accomplish three important goals:
First, it will make the junta accountable for its crimes with a potential indictment by the International Criminal Court. Second, it will address the widespread culture of impunity in Burma. Third, it has the potential to deter future crimes against humanity in Myanmar.

For two decades, ethnic minorities in Myanmar have suffered while our diplomatic efforts failed to bear fruit. The time has come for the Security Council to act.
Paulo Sergio Pinheiro was the United Nations special rapporteur on human rights in Myanmar from 2000 to 2008.

US LANG AI BURMA POLICY – makau grup yin mungdan ni hpe hkra mai ai lam

Regional implications of US policy on Burma (Kachin translation)
Kavi Chongkittavorn, The Nation, Thailand, 5 October 2009

(Ga-numhtet: The Nation, Thailand, English shi laika hta pru ai commentary re. Commentary ka ai sat lawat gaw laksan shai ai, mabyin langai ngai a lam hpe ka yang lachyum hpe shading ai, kadai ra rawng nna byin ai ngu ai hku n yu ai. Ndai US Policy ningnan lam hta “Myen SPDC hte mazum nga sai ni hpe US policy hkra nga ai” ngu ai daram sha tsun ai; India hte Miwa hpe hkra ai hte ASEAN hte Australia hpe hkra ai lam ni gaw kaga ga rai nna grai shai nga ai lam hpe n sagawn madun dan ai. Dai majaw akyu pru hkra nga jang ga-yan lapran hkan rawng nga ai daw hpe ahpre shaw la ra nga ai. Dai majaw ndai ga gale hpe htawn shana na matu dasang lajang ai re. Lachyum ginsi ngu na ni hpe nambat shakap nna madun tawn ai. KAF/USA, 7 Ocober 2009)

1. Myen mung hte seng ai US policy hpe grai sadi nna ka tawn nga ai; dai ni Myen mung a manghkang kaba hta lam langai ngai a majaw shang lawm nga ai mungdan ni yawng hpe hkra nan hkra shading tawn nga ai. US policy a majaw US gaw Myen mung mabyin lam hta shang wa sai, dai a majaw ndai aten nna lam magup hta shai wa ai lam byin ra sai. Myen hpyen atsuya gaw, kaga mungdan ni hte ndai lang tengsha jahkrup shaga mayu ai, gajam kalam ginsup ai lam n rai sai, ngu ai lailen sakse hpe shadan madun dan ra hkra, SPDC hpe hkra na matu US policy shading tawn nga ai.

2. US lang ai ladat hta lawan tin shai wa ra ai ngu ai hku n re; Myen a lailen hte mung kata na mabyin hpe US gaw azin ayang sagawn nna shen mayu nna re, ndai hpe ra ai aten la nna galaw na re.Dai aten hta SPDC maga de nna jet ai, dingman ai shawang amyit hte shang lawm jahkrup shaga nga ai, ngu ai lailen sakse madun ra na re. US gaw SPDC hte jahkrup ai lam gaw jaw ai lam re, ngu myit dawdan lu hkra sakse madun na lit gaw SPDC a lit re.

Tim, ya byin nga ai manghkang gaw grai na hkra byin nga sai, kadai ni a matu mung n kaja ai manghkang re. Ndai lang yaw shada ai lam byin wa na rai yang US hta n-ga kaga mungdan ni mung shang lawm nna shawng de shamu shamawt lu hkra htu ganawng lawm ra na re. Obama atsuya gaw ndai zawn lawt lu na lam n mu mat wa sai manghkang hpe magra jum nna lama ma shabyin dat na hku rai nga ai majaw, kaga mungdan ni mung tinang a Myen hte seng ai ladat hpe gram sharai na lam pru wa sai.

Lachyum: Miwa hte India gaw, Myen mung democracy byin wa lu na ningpawt sharawt lam hta n shaga ai, hpaga lam hku sha sa lai wa sai. Ndai ladat matut hkan na nga yang US policy hta nhtan shai mat wa sana re. Miwa hte India a matu SPDC hpaga lam gaw manghkang byin wa na re. ASEAN hpung hte Australia gaw, democracy lam hta shadut yu sai re majaw, ndai ni a masa hpe US policy grau n-gun ja wa shangun sana re. Ya aten hta kata lam hta shang lawm ai lam hpe ta-tut n galaw ai sha, shinggan nna marawn shaga ai ni, European Union zawn, ya aten nna gaw tatut shang lawm na hpe US policy myit mada nga sai. Dai n rai yang kaga lam hta shanhte US hte mazum ai lam hta hkra wa na rai nga ai.

3. US yaw shada ai lam hta lawan byin na daw hte aten la nna gawgap na daw, ngu daw lahkawng garan tawn nga ai. Shawng e shabyin na daw hta ya aten e jahkrup shaga ai lam, General Than Shwe hte Aung San Suu Kyi ni lawm nga na lam, Myen hpyen atsuya hpe shawa shang lawm lu na chyinghka hpaw tawn ya na lam hta aja awa shadut na lam ni re. US gaw ya aten hta Myen mung hte seng nna jahkrat tawn ai sanction policy ni yawng hpe ningpawt nna bai sawn aru mayu ai, dai makan ngut lu hkra aten la mayu ai. Jahkrat tawn ai sanction ni a lam hpe mung sharawt nna myit yu na re. Naw myit yu nga ai aten hta sanction lam gaw maren grin nga na re. Ra ai lam byin pru yang jat pyi jat bang na re. Ndai hpe SPDC tup hkrak chye na ra nga ai.

4. US gaw 2010 hta galaw na ra-lata a matu shingdang ai dingbai dingna ni n nga ai, mung shawa yawng mayawng shang lawm lu ai ra lata byin hkra, galaw ra mara yawng hpe lajang ai hta shang garum na lam re. Ndai tsang de du lu na matu Myen maga de nna US a matu myit mada shara nga na re, ngu ai sakse madun dan ra ai. Aung San Suu Kyi hpe rim shingdang ai lam hta na lawt shangun ai gaw dai baw sakse langai rai na re. Shada da kam hkat lu ai de du lu hkra jawm galaw ai makan lit lam ni gaw, ga shadawn, nang-hpam ai baw shapraw ai, dut sha ai lam hpe ru-gawt tsan kau na lam; shawa hkamja lam hte lamu ga ginra (environment) hkam ja lam, majan kaba #2 hta hkrat sum ai ni a angaw angam tam mahkawng na lam ni lawm nga ai.
5. 1991 e hpang nna Myen mung manghkang lam gaw ASEAN a lit re, ngu wa ai ladat byin wa ai majaw, ASEAN hte US, European Community ni hte lam shai mat wa sai; ASEAN gaw sanction lang ai hpe n ra ai, mung shawa sha machyi hkam ai, nga ai. Dai ni US policy hta sanction lam hpe jep sagawn yu ga, ASEAN hte myit hkrum na mai ai; tim, democracy ningpawt gawgap lam hta ASEAN tsun shaga na n-gun grai kya lai wa sai. Dai ni US policy gaw democracy sharawt lam hta n-gun kaba jat bang na lam re. Ndai lam hta aja wa shadut na lit gaw dai ni US la shang wa ai lit ningnan rai nga ai. Ndai lam hku nna sanction lam de aten du jang jawm sawn yu na re.

6. November 15 hta Singapore e galaw na ASEAN Summit ningbaw zuphpawng hta US mung lawm na rai, Myen Prime Minister Thien Sein mung lawm na re. US hte SPDC zuphpawng ginra e shaga hkat ai lam gaw manghkang n rai na sai. Lahkawng maga a matu US policy majaw lit ningnan law law pru nga sai.

7. Thai-Burma ga jarit marawn dingyang hku nna matsan chyaren ni tut hprawng shang wa nga ai, n shawp ai baw hpaga galaw ai ni pru pru shang shang rai nga ai. Dai ni du hkra lahkawng maga de nna ndai manghkang hpe shading nna mahtai tam ai lam n nga ai. US policy a majaw Thai atsuya ya gaw, SPDC hpe ndai lam US a man e mai tsun sai. Ndai policy a majaw SPDC lit la ra ai lam gaw US myit mada ai lailen sharai ai lam hta lawm nga chyalu re.

8. SPDC gaw nuclear laknak masa hta chya pa ginsup ai lam, North Korea hte mazum ai lam ni nga nga ai; ndai ni gaw Thailand a matu tsang shara kaba rai nga ai. Nuclear laknak lam hte seng nna jahkrat tawn ai UN Resolution 1874 hpe US gaw North Korea, Iran hkan ya hkan shatup na lam shakut nga chyalu re; policy ningnan a majaw ndai lam hpe SPDC n mai koi mat sana re. US gaw SPDC hpe Resolution 1874 hkan shatup shangun sana re.

9. Laiwa sai ten hta Thai atsuya gaw, SPDC n shawp n kap ai bungli lam hpe chye lawm tim tinang ra ai daw, tsun mayu ai baw hpaga shabyin daw hpe sha mu ai zawn rai nna, yupmang mu ai zawn re policy ni lang lai wa sai. US policy a majaw Thai mung atsuya a matu mung lit ningnan pru ra ai.

Regional implications of US policy on Burma

Kavi Chongkittavorn
The Nation (Thailand)
Publication Date: 05-10-2009

The carefully crafted 490-word US policy on Burma is aimed at all players in the region and afar, directly and indirectly, involved in the Burmese quagmire. Coming as it did at this juncture, the policy will be used as a new benchmark to gauge Rangoon's genuine desire for dialogue and openness. It also seeks to rejuvenate international engagement with regional dynamics. This represents another much-needed effort to break the current impasse that the regime can take after Australia made the first attempt—with a long list of demands-at the 1994 Asean ministerial meeting in Bangkok.

Washington realises now that the new approach is likely to be "slow and incremental." In other words, it will be a step by step process. This time a more concerted international effort is required to ease the Burmese crisis after decades of sanctions. The Obama Administration should be lauded for seizing this unique opportunity to formulate a new policy that some regional players can identify with.

The US softer approach has short and long-term objectives. In the next 15 months, pressure on Burma would be a step up building on existing progress accomplished since August including increased US-Burmese high-level meetings and dialogues, as well as ongoing communications between General Than Shwe and the opposition leader, Aung San Suu Kyi on ways to loosen up sanctions. After the US completed its policy reviews, Suu Kyi reiterated her readiness again to help end sanctions against the regime, which she first outlined two and half years ago.

Washington also wants to lay groundwork for inclusive, free and fair elections next year in Burma. Judging from the tone of US senior officials, any positive response from the junta on Suu Kyi's unconditional release or electoral process in coming weeks or months would immediately help to build up mutual confidence and widen the communication channels between the two capitals. Cooperation on counter-narcotics, health, environmental protection, and the recovery of World War II-era missing-in-action (MIAs) could be new incentives.

Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Kurt Campbell made clear that lifting or easing sanctions at the outset of a dialogue without meaningful progress on the US concerns would be a mistake. "We will maintain our existing sanctions until we see concrete progress, and continue to work with the international community to ensure that those sanctions are effectively coordinated," he told a Senate Subcommittee on East Asia and Pacific Affairs last week.

In the medium and long term, the US policy seeks to break up the twin influence of China and India over Burma. In the policy statement, the US says it will continue to cooperate and coordinate closely with the UN, Asean, the EU, China, Japan, India, Australia, the Burmese opposition and others. In reality, the US targets China and India—the two key players which have propped up and strengthened the military junta. The US new positions are more or less closer to those held by key players which prefer more contact,with sanctions still intact, or backing easing of sanctions with more humanitarian assistance.

Since Cyclone Nargis, the EU has picked humanitarian options for the Burmese people albeit growing criticism that it would benefit the regime. For decades, Japan has limited its assistance aid to humanitarian and human resource development, especially in economic planning. Australia also tried without much success to increase awareness on human rights and democracy inside Burma.

With the US new policy, Asean will find it easier to work with the US on Burma—a new element under the Obama administration and Asean. Asean opposes sanctions against Burma, since it was admitted into the grouping in 1997. Apart from sharing common objectives of seeing a united, prosperous and democratic country, now the two sides are moving closer on sanctions. Asean argues sanctions must stop as it hurts the Burmese people.

Ironically, the Asean-US closer cooperation on Burma effectively put an end to the Aseanisation process of Burmese conundrums that began in earnest in Luxembourg in 1991, fuelling the longstanding feud between EU and Asean over Burma. Even before the country joined the grouping, Asean leaders believed they could handle the Burmese issue better than the outsiders through peer pressure and the Asean way. The polarisation reached its peak in 1997 when Burma was admitted to Asean with strong support from former Malaysian prime minister Mahathir Mohammad and Indonesian ex-President Suharto.

The US-led "internationalisation" process could overtake the Asean-initiated or even the UN framework, if Burma responds positively to Washington's overtures in a timely manner. In that case, Rangoon has lots of explaining to do for its Asean colleagues and international community. Foreign Minister Kasit Piromya's decision to give up the joint Asean appeal on Suu Kyi's freedom, citing the existing international efforts, confirmed this inevitable trend. Like it or not, Asean future positions on Burma would have to take in broad-based international sentiments.

The first US-Asean summit in Singapore, scheduled on November 15, will include Burmese Prime Minister Thien Sein. It was no longer a taboo for the leaders of US and Burma to meet. The summit—whether it is institutionalised-would further deepen the US role played in regional issues. With its Asean ambassador in residence in Jakarta (the first in Asean) to be announced soon, Washington will also have a senior official follow up on this issue with the Asean Secretariat. Later this month, at the Asean summit in Cha-am, Asean expects to see more positive signs from Burma related to the electoral process and relations with the opposition partners.

Closer to home, the US policy will impact on the porous Thai-Burma border. Issues related to attacks on minorities, drugs and human smuggling would be placed high on the US watch lists. More than before, both Thailand and Malaysia—not to mention China over the Kokang conflict- have all suffered from the influx of Burmese refugees.

Recent attacks on minorities along the Thai border by the Burmese troops again displaced thousands of minorities inside the Thai territory.

In years ahead, the US policy serves to enhance Thailand's position vis-a-vis Burma over its nuclear ambition. US senior officials have reiterated the UN Security Council's resolution 1874 (as well as 1718 during testimonies) which deals with nuclear proliferation as part of the Burmese policy gist. Washington has been very concerned about the nature and extent of Burma's nuclear ties with North Korea. During recent testimony, Senator Richard Lugar from Indiana continued to question Burma's motives in dispatching hundreds of its officials to Russia for nuclear technology training. He pointed out the number of persons travelling to Russia for specialised training seemed to be far beyond the number needed for the eventual operation of a nuclear reactor for medical research purposes, intended to be built by the junta with Russian government assistance Thailand has yet to treat with seriousness this explosive issue.

Except for selective army intelligence officials working closely with Australian and American counterparts, the rest of Thai society has been kept in the dark on Burma's nuclearisation program and its implications on the country's future security. The Thai policy makers, in particular the National Security Council, tend to view Burma's quagmire and security concerns through myopic bilateral prisms, which immediately mitigate any serious strategic evaluation of potential nuclear threats to Thailand.